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1. Introduction
In March 1999, the EU Heads of Governments and States met at Berlin under the German
Presidency, where they reached at the long-waited overall agreement on Agenda 2000
package. By attaining a compromise on the policy reforms proposed by the Commission
almost two years ago, the agreement of this extraordinary European Council Summit is
supposed to pave the way for the future enlargement of the EU with the 10 Central and
Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and Cyprus.
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), still representing the most important and most
comprehensive policy of the Community in terms, at least, of integrity and budget, could
not but be an essential part of the Agenda 2000 package. In fact, its proposed new reform
was perhaps the most "delicate" and the most "complicated" issue of the package. After a
profound analysis of the current situation of the agricultural sector inside and outside the
EU, the Commission submitted its detailed proposals, based on a number of targets that
had to be met.
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the final agreement is adequate, indeed, to
meet the initial targets of the reform, as were outlined by the Commission, and in particular,
to meet the requirements of the forthcoming enlargement, from the point of view of both,
the internal market of EU-15 and the new comers.
2. The background: A brief overview
2.1 After the completion of the 1992 radical reform of the CAP and despite the fact
that it succeeded in solving the most pressing problems of the early ‘90s, other important
developments appeared advocating towards a further reform of it.
The most important reasons are considered to be two-fold, mostly internal in nature, but
also reinforced by two external factors:
                                                          
1 The present paper (final draft: August 1999) is to be considered as an extension of shorter comments that
have been included in "A Guide to the Enlargement of the EU (II) - A review of the Process, Negotiations,
Policy Reforms and Enforcement Capacity" published by EIPA, 1999 (ISBN 90-6779-135-0). Special
thanks are due to Prof. Phedon Nicolaides, head of Unit III, EIPA, for his encouragement and suggestions
and to Dr. S. Bilal, Senior lecturer at EIPA, for his useful comments and suggestions, from which this paper
has benefited a lot. However, the views expressed here should be attributed to my own responsibility.© EIPA
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Internal factors
•   The limitations set out in the agricultural budget, bound up with the principle of
budgetary discipline, put an absolute burden to any fundamental increase of
agricultural expenditure in the future. It is well known that, under the budgetary
discipline (followed since 1988), the annual growth in the ceiling for agricultural
expenditure can not exceed 74% of the increase of the Community's GNP
•   The continuing increase in productivity and yields, the growing competition on both
external and internal agricultural markets (through increased market access), the
commitments that have been undertaken (especially on the volume and value of
export subsidies) under the Uruguay Round Agreement for Agriculture (URAA), all
are factors that put EC agriculture in a high risk of new market imbalances in the near
future, if the internal prices were to continue remaining at a higher than the world
level.
•   There is an increasing pressure to focus on new priorities of CAP;
•   - to enforce the food safety & quality standards,
•   - to achieve a more environmentally friendly agriculture and higher welfare
standards, which are increasingly public demands. After all, the inclusion of
sustainable development as one of the EU’s objectives into the Amsterdam Treaty
indicates that further progress must be made towards environmentally sustainable
production and consumption patterns,
•   - to simplify the EU agricultural legislation,
•   The continuing decline in the farm population (which fell by 4.7% per year after
1990) and the social, economic, historical and cultural needs to maintain rural
population in the regions call for the creation of alternative sources of income and
employment in rural areas by reinforcing a rural development policy. Since
agriculture continues to keep a large part of rural activities, there is an increasing
need to extend and enrich CAP with new elements.
External factors
•   The negotiations under a new W.T.O. Round which are going to be launched in
December 1999 (in Seattle), are expected to push towards liberalising further the
agricultural trade, by putting additional commitments in the level of agricultural
support.
•   Last, but not least, the future enlargement of the EU represents a major challenge for
the future orientations of CAP.
To a certain extent, all those factors are inter-related, in the sense that the impact of the
one on CAP influences the impact of the other. Therefore, they cannot be considered
separately.
2.2 In relation to the eastward enlargement, in particular, it is true that Agriculture
still plays a very important role in the social-economic structure of all the CEECs. In
most of them, it has been far more important than it is for the EU, and this would have
serious implications for the EU after the accession of all the 10 applicants.© EIPA
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According to the available data (1996), it becomes clear that the most pressing problems
that have to be tackled by the EU, are considered to be:
•   The relatively large size of agricultural land (the total agricultural area would increase
by 40% after the accession of all the CEEC-10);
•   The relatively high importance of agriculture to the economies of the CEEC-10
(contributing 7.0% in GDP versus 1.7% in the EU-15);
•   The high agricultural employment which would make the absolute number of farmers
more than double (22% of total employment in CEEC-10 versus 5.1% in EU-15);
•   The low GDP in CEEC-10 and the much lower labour productivity in their
agriculture in comparison with the EU;
•   The great potential in production capacities (all the CEECs underwent a considerable
decline in agricultural yields due to various factors: the depressed producer prices and
backward technologies prior to the transition, the market liberalisation of the
transition process, the decline of the ratio of product to input prices, the lack of
inputs, the insecurity with respect to property rights in agricultural land. Thus, with
full agricultural recovery, all those factors are expected to be remedied and, as an
effect, production might increase considerably, even in medium term);
•   Though much lower when compared with EU, the productivity of agricultural labour
(GDP per labour unit) in most of the CEECs appears relatively higher when it is
compared with the other sectors of their economies. This indicates a comparative
advantage for agriculture and if this remains, most CEECs should be able to become
net exporters of agricultural products;
•   The relatively low administrative capacity of the applicants to administer the acquis.
2.3 All these elements imply that, even after the rapid changes of the last years,
considerable differences still exist between the agricultural situations in both parties,
especially in terms of productivity and structures. If it were supposed that CAP would be
extended to the applicant countries in its current form (of the 1992 reform), the
implications for the CAP and the other EU policies would be enormous, especially in
terms of budgetary resources.
The implications would be also significant for the applicant countries too, especially in
terms of efficiency and income distribution.
2.4  The Agenda 2000 was the Commission’s reply to the request of the Madrid
Summit (December 1995) to embark on the preparation for enlargement, immediately
after the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) that lasted in1996. It is therefore quite
understandable why the whole package focused on the necessary adjustments of CAP,
together with the Structural Policy: First, both are the most important sectoral policies of
the EU, absorbing together almost 85% of the total Budget; Second, both are expected to
contribute and play a decisive role at strengthening economic and social cohesion, (which
has become one of the three priority objectives under the Amsterdam Treaty, the other
two being the full operation of the Single Market and the introduction of EMU).© EIPA
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It is obvious that the accession of a large number of poorer countries into EU, with an
agricultural sector much more important on average than in the EU-15 and with great
structural discrepancies, would pose a major challenge to both parties, concerning these
two particular policies.
In this respect, the new CAP reform proposed in the framework of the Agenda 2000 could
not be considered as an independent issue. It has to be seen in the broader context of the
Agenda, as regards the future EU Budget,  Structural Policy and enlargement. And this
became even more obvious after the Berlin agreement of March 1999 and the adoption of
the reform.
Indeed, the Commission, following its initial guidelines of July 1997, submitted to the
Council (March 1998) a comprehensive package of reforms for the most important products
and issues regulated by CAP, going beyond the points of the initial communication.
The changes proposed for a new reform were designed:
1. To improve the competitiveness of EC agriculture on domestic and world markets, as
well as to benefit consumers (through lower prices) and leave more room for price
differentiation in favor of quality products;
2. To reduce the risk of expensive and unsaleable surpluses, but also to continue protecting
farmers’ income;
3. To give more emphasis to food safety and environmental concerns;
4. To provide an integrated approach to the development of the countryside by making rural
development an integral part of the CAP and bringing it under the agricultural budget;
5. To allow the EU to go into the next Round of WTO negotiations with more aggressive
stance and to defend the European model of agriculture;
6. To accommodate the new comers in a smooth and feasible way, within the existing
budgetary and other limits.
To reach these targets, the Commission proposed, as a general approach, to deepen and
extend the reform of 1992. That is, price cuts for key products (to eliminate or reduce
considerably the gap between internal and world prices) and continuing the shift from
the price support system to direct payments.
In particular, this general approach of the Commission was accompanied by the principle
that all the market support mechanisms of CAP (intervention buying-in, set-aside, export
subsidies, etc) would act mostly as safety nets in the future by taking some basic steps,
the most important of which were:© EIPA
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•   A price reduction 20% for cereals that would allow a complete elimination of the gap
and, therefore, of the need for intervention or (most important) export subsidies to the
products of the sector;
•   Alignment of the special regime of oilseeds to that of cereals in one step, with two
important purposes; to make the direct aids non-specific compensatory payments for
all arable crops, by reducing considerably the high aids paid previously for oilseeds
and to eliminate the constraints imposed by the Blair House agreement (concerning
the basic condition for a maximum area of production);
•   Increase of the compensatory payments (CPs) representing not fully but partially
(50%) the additional price cuts;
•   Application of 0% set-aside in arable sector;
•   Careful but essential reductions of prices for beef and milk sector in two and three
steps respectively;
•   Replacement of the intervention mechanism for beef sector by a system of private
storage;
•   A slight increase (2%) of milk quotas to cover specific needs of mountainous regions
and of young farmers, together with the prospect to reconsider the whole quota
regime after 2006.
In this respect, the Commission submitted to the Council specific regulatory proposals
covering the following products and issues:
1. All Arable Crops (Cereals, Oilseeds, Protein Products, Potato starch)
2. Beef and Veal Sector
3. Dairy products, including the milk quotas regime
4. Certain Horizontal measures, that is, proposals for the establishment of common rules as
    regards the CPs and applied to all COMs of products for which they are provided for,
5. Rural Development measures.
It should be noted that, in relation to this package, two additional reforms are connected:
a) Olive oil Regime. The proposal was presented separately but initially constituted part of
the package. However, the reform of this sector appeared to be urgent and finally was
decided in Autumn 1998, to be applied for the next 3-year period (as a transitional regime).
The sector will be revised in 2001.
b) Wine sector. In July 1998, the Commission submitted a relevant reform proposal, which
became also a part of the package.
For each product (or for each Common Organisation of Market – C.M.O.), the package
included, of course, detailed proposals for measures to be adopted that were far for being
generally accepted. However, at the final stage of the negotiations, the individual proposals
attracted less attention, since the dispute had been moved to the financial issues and the
demands for re-balancing the EU funding.© EIPA
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On March 11, 1999, the EU Council for Agriculture reached a broad compromise after a
marathon of negotiations that lasted some two-and-a half-weeks. The deal of the
Agricultural Ministers roughly resembled the Commission's original proposals, although the
compromise included some significant concessions in all commodity sectors.
This deal, however, was decisively altered by the final agreement in the Berlin Summit, as it
can be seen in the following chapters.
3. Basic elements of the Berlin Agreement
3.1 The financial perspective and the agricultural guideline
The general orientation of the Berlin European Council was that the budgetary
imbalances should be resolved by introducing “corrections” to the expenditure side of the
Budget, and especially of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund
(EAGGF). As a result, the final compromise concentrated on making savings rather than
reaching the targets of the reform. To achieve this, most efforts focused on ways to
reduce the total amount of spending, not on market-distorting support measures, but
especially on CPs provided directly to farmers and aimed to protect their incomes. This
was justified by the fact that today the CPs represent the most important part (almost
50%) of the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF.
Although many options were discussed, in the end, “stabilisation” of agricultural
spending was decided. Stabilisation means that total agricultural spending (excluding
rural development and veterinary measures) will be kept at the current level (in real
terms); i.e. an average annual expenditure of EUR 40.5 billion (plus an annual inflation
increase of 2%). This gives a total budget of EUR 307 billion over the 7 year period
(2000-2006).
A first issue implied by this decision is that it is questionable whether the agricultural
guideline followed since 1988 (annual increase of agricultural expenditure not exceeding
74% of the increase of the GNP of the EU as a whole) is still feasible. A second, and
most important in relation to the forthcoming enlargement, is the fact that the financial
guideline agreed for agriculture for the period 2000-2006 includes a ring-fencing of
accession-related and pre-accession expenditure. Ring-fencing implies that the amounts
foreseen for pre- and after-accession are fixed and safeguarded, since a clear distinction
is made between the financing of the EU-15 and that reserved for the applicant
countries
2.
                                                          
2 In particular, concerning the enlargement, the total amount of pre-accession aid is EUR 3,120 million per
year, at 1999 prices (SAPARD 520, plus ISPA 1,040, plus Phare 1,560). After the accession of the first 6
applicants, payments under the Guarantee Fund (market measures plus specific rural development
measures) will amount to EUR 1.6 billion in 2002 rising to EUR 3.4 billion in 2006. These estimates
assume that CPs will not be payable in the new comers.© EIPA
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This rigidity was, perhaps, an unavoidable compromise to calm down the fears expressed
by certain Member States (M-S) that accession would result to a large absorption of the
available resources, at the cost of those needed for the agricultural markets of the EU-15.
However, given that relatively very small amounts of money are dedicated for (market
and rural development) measures applied to the eventual new comers from 2002 and
beyond, the question is whether these foreseen amounts in the various budgetary lines
would be adequate to meet with the necessities expected to arise from the whole process
of accession.
3.2 Agricultural Markets
In relation to the proposals of the Commission and the outcome of the inside (technical)
negotiations of the Council of Ministers for Agriculture, the most important elements of
the final agreement reached at Berlin European Council could be summarised as follows:
3.2.1 Arable Crops
•   The intervention price for arable crops (cereals, oilseeds, protein crops) will be reduced
by 15% (instead of 20% proposed by the Commission and accepted by Agriculture
Ministers) in two equal steps (instead of one-step cut), starting in the 2000/01 period
•   The direct (compensatory) payment for cereals increases also in two steps but at a lower
level than initially proposed
3
•   The oilseed regime (and non-textile linseed) is not immediately aligned to that of
cereals. The area payments will be gradually reduced over three stages (and not in one
step) before aligning it with the cereals payment in 2002.
•   The basic (compulsory) set-aside, is fixed at 10% for all the period 2000/06 (instead of
falling to 0% from 2000, as originally suggested by the Commission). The voluntary set-
aside is still allowed at a minimum level of 10% of the arable area across the EU.
Therefore, it cannot be prohibited by the Member States. The extraordinary set-aside
(imposed, up to now, in cases of exceeding the base areas of production) is completely
abolished. In general, however, the payment per Ha and the rate of set-aside could be
modified in the future, according to market developments
•   Silage cereals: This is one of the points where even the Commission proposals went
beyond the initial guidelines. That is, despite the initial guideline of the Agenda to
exclude them from direct payments, finally silage cereals were proposed to remain into
the system of arable crops. Although this proposal was met with strong criticism in the
beginning, it was finally adopted by the farm Ministers and the Summit. In addition, as a
concession to FIN and SVE, grass silage will be also eligible for arable direct payments
as these countries cannot produce maize silage.
                                                          
3 For cereals, the amount will increase from 54 Euro/t to 58.67/t in 2000/01 and further to 63/t (instead of
66/t), multiplied by the historic reference yield of each region. For the other crops (protein, linseed) the relevant
amounts are adapted accordingly (R. 1251/1999, Article 4).© EIPA
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3.2.2 Beef and Veal Sector
•   The effective market support level will be reduced by 20% (instead of 30% proposed by
the Commission) in three steps (starting on 1.7.2000).
•   From 1.7.2002 a private storage system is introduced (similar to the pig meat sector)
that will be triggered (and storage aid may be granted) when the average market price
falls below 103% of the new basic price for beef (EUR 2,224/t). Intervention
mechanism, however, does not disappear. The Commission has to “follow closely the
market” for beef and, if necessary, to take the appropriate measures, including the
potentiality of intervention buying-in.
•   Direct payments (premia/animal head) will be increased from 2002 (to compensate
the price cuts) for both, male animals and suckler cows, subject to national ceilings.
The pre-reform level plus 50% of the increase constitute a Community-wide basic
payment. The original proposals of the amounts, however, have been slightly
modulated in accordance with the compromise.
•   A new slaughter premium is introduced of EUR 80 for all the animals over the age of 8
months.
•   Extra extensification premia (for environmental reasons) are increased, with greater
flexibility of the M-S to chose criteria and rates of aid, depending on the stocking
density of the holdings.
•   “National Envelopes” (one of the innovations of the original proposals) are finally
introduced into the system and retained in the compromise. This concept means that
50% of the increase of the CPs (premia) will be distributed to M-S (on the basis of their
share of production) allowing them to allocate these amounts according to national
criteria. The national criteria would be subject to specific priorities (per animal and/or
per hectare of permanent pasture) within certain limits and according to common rules.
•   The provisions on trade with third countries:  Export refunds and border protection
measures will be carried over from existing legislation as they stand, except of some
minor amendments.
3.2.3 Dairy Regime
Due to the high cost of the proposed reform, the Berlin Summit decided to delay its
implementation until 2005/06 (instead of starting at 2000/01 proposed by the Commission
or 2003/04 agreed by the Agricultural Council. To this extent, the internal market provisions
concerning the intervention and public storage of butter and skimmed milk powder, as well
as the schemes for private storage aids and marketing measures, all remain largely
unchanged. Further measures agreed:
•   Intervention prices (for butter and skimmed milk powder) are reduced to 15% in 3
(instead of 4) equal steps, beginning in 2005/6.
•   The price cuts will be compensated by introducing gradually a new dairy premium, to be
paid on a flat rate basis per tonne of quota (and  not per virtual cow as originally
proposed). Compensation, therefore, will be payable based on the quota held by each© EIPA
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producer in the 1999/2000 year. In other words, no compensation will be payable in
respect of the additional quotas allocated according to the present agreement.
•   National envelopes are introduced (like in the beef sector). However, payments will
start from 2005 (not from 2000 as in the original proposal).
•   Milk quotas are maintained (at least) until 31.3.2008, since the great majority  of
delegations had agreed or supported that the system should retained until 2006, with
some differentiation
4.
•   Quite differently to the original proposal of the Commission, the Summit agreed an
overall increase of 2.4% in the total reference quantity for milk to be reached at the end
of implementation of the reform in 2008. In particular, to meet with the strong demands
of some M-S (each one for special reasons), five M-S (GR, ESP, IRL, IT, UK-Northern
Ireland) will get an extra quota from 2000/01 onwards. And then, there will be a "linear"
increase of 1.5% for all the remaining M-S in the three years of reform between 2005/06
and 2007/08. This amounts to an overall 2.4% increase (instead of 2%).
•   The Agricultural Council of March 11, included in the final compromise an important
statement according to which, the EU is committed to review the quota regime in 2003,
even if the quotas are retained. The Summit did not change this prospect. On this
occasion and because of many pressures, it is rather sure that the entire milk regime will
be reviewed at the same time.
3.2.4 Horizontal Measures
A new Regulation establishes that all C.O.M.s providing for any kind of direct income
support payments
5 would follow certain rules. All the new rules raised in this regulation
constitute innovating issues of CAP in its future form. In particular:
•   Environmental protection/Cross-compliance: According to this principle, the M-S are
obliged to introduce and define appropriate environmental measures to be applied by
farmers. According to the M-S own consideration, these measures may include the
possibility that farmers would be fully eligible to the CPs (and other support schemes) on
the assumption that they respect certain environmental requirements. In cases where the
environmental requirements are not respected, M-S shall decide the appropriate
sanctions (proportionate to the seriousness of the ecological consequences). Such
sanctions could be the reduction or even the cancellation of the benefits accruing from
the CPs.
                                                          
4 It is interesting to note that in the course of the negotiations (Sept 1998), a minority of 4 M-S, the so-called
"London Club" (DM, I, SVE, UK) forwarded a firm commitment to push towards a higher price cut by 30%
and the abolishment of the quotas beyond 2006. They also suggested the current intervention arrangement for
butter and skimmed milk powder to be replaced with a "safety net", citing the example of private storage
proposed for beef. (Up to a certain stage, Greece also backed the club of 4, arguing that if it did not get an
increase of its quota by 150 000 tones, it would prefer a full abolition of quotas. In this respect, ESP, Italy and
Ireland raised their own claims for an increase of their own quotas).
5 The list of the support schemes has been expanded by including, not only the CPs on the three know
sectors (arable crops, beef, dairy), but also certain production aids for olive-oil, tobacco, bananas, seeds,
sheep and goat premia, LFA supplements, as well as the special schemes applied in the disadvantageous
islands of EU, like the French DOM, Madeira, Canary and Aegean islands© EIPA
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•   Modulation: According to this measure, M-S are authorised to modulate direct payments
per farm in a way that are related to employment on the farm (or overall prosperity of the
holding). In other words, M-S may decide to reduce the direct payments in cases where
the labour force falls short of certain limits, to be determined by the M-S. The reduction
of support, however, should not exceed 20% of the total amount of payments.
•   Equal treatment of farmers: Both measures, cross-compliance and modulation, would be
applied in a way as to ensure equal treatment among the farmers and to avoid market
and competition distortions.
•   Savings from cross-compliance and modulation, can be used (as an additional
Community support), not only into agri-environment as originally proposed, but also
into other rural development measures (early-retirement schemes, Less Favoured Areas,
areas with environmental restrictions, forestry, etc).
•   The proposal to apply digressive ceilings on the CPs in order to avoid any excessive
transfer of public funds to individual farmers, was finally deleted,  due to strong
resistance of UK and some other M-S.
3.2.5. Wine
The proposal of the Commission became part of the Agenda 2000 package in July 1998. It
focused on improving the market balance by encouraging producers to improve the quality
of their wine rather than disposing of the unwanted production.
In general, the proposal was accepted by the Farm Ministers (and ratified by the Summit) as
a part of the overall compromise. In brief, the main issues agreed, are:
•   The existing ban on new vineyards planting is retained until 2010 (at least). At the
same time, grubbing-up measures are also retained, but will be more specifically
targeted by M-S in those regions with serious and persistent structural surplus.
•   A limited number of new planting rights was agreed, to enable plantings in areas with
expanding demand. The new plantings may cover in total 51 000 Ha (instead of 35
000 Ha initially proposed by the Commission) allocated to M-S,  plus 17 000 Ha that
will stay as a EC reserve (at the discretion of the Wine Management Committee).
•   With the aim to adapt the vineyards to the market demand, the growers are encouraged
to tear up old vines and plant newer with varieties of higher quality. An extra amount of
450m Euro is dedicated to this purpose. The growers will be compensated by direct aids
for the initial income losses. In addition, the cost of conversion equipment (cellars,
training, marketing) will be eligible for 50% EC financing (75% in Objective 1 areas).
The rest of the bill will be paid by the producer (NOT by the M-S).
•   Various mechanisms of distillation (“Preventive distillation”, “compulsory distillation”
and “support distillation”) used up to now as an intervention mechanism, are
abandoned. A new “crisis” distillation measure will be available (on a voluntary basis),
to be triggered in cases of severe surpluses and serious quality problems.
•   Finally, the existing ban in imports of wine must is lifted (in accordance with the WTO
rules). However, the origin of the must used to enrich EC wines has to be clearly
mentioned on the label of the commercial wines (like the imported wines). On the other
hand, the ban on “coupage” (blending EC wines with imported ones) remains.© EIPA
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3.3 Rural Development
3.3.1. It should be clear that the "Common Rural Development Policy" which is included
into the package of the Agenda is not considered to be an independent policy. In fact, the
relevant Regulation aims to be an integral part of CAP, accompanying and complementing
the other instruments (price support, market management measures, direct payments),
contributing therefore to the achievement of the overall objectives of CAP laid down in the
Article 33 (ex 39) of the Treaty.
Additionally, it is known that, after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, all the sectoral
policies (including, of course, CAP and CRDP), should take seriously into account the
objectives of economic & social cohesion (Article 130) and should contribute to their
achievement.
Therefore, the proposed Rural Development measures should contribute to the cohesion of:
•   Regions whose development is lagging behind (Objective 1) and
•   Regions facing structural difficulties
Rural Development Policy is supposed to follow the principle of subsidiarity (decentralised
policy, emphasis on participation, "bottom-up" approach), that is the Community measures
are coming to supplement (and not replace) the national measures. That is why, at the
Community level, only basic support criteria are laid down. Practically, this means that the
measures proposed and accepted in the final agreement are and will remain under the co-
financing principle. However, support offered by the M-S alone would be subject to the
specific State Aid rules. For the monitoring and the evaluation of the Rural Development
support, appropriate rules are established, using as reference well-defined indicators.
3.3.2. The new Regulation establishes a framework for Community Support for Rural
Development.  The Farm Ministers agreed to accept the proposals, by making only some
partial changes.
•   The main (and perhaps the only) change of the proposal is to combine all the existing
rural and structural measures into one piece of legislation, contributing therefore to the
simplification of the system.
•   The new Regulation includes all the existing rural development measures in the certain
order. It is designed to have implementing measures attached, which can be used by the
M-S invited to set their own local programme priorities from a menu of options.
•   There will be two groups of measures financed by FEOGA: (a) The three 1992
accompanying measures plus the LFA scheme, financed by the Guarantee Section
(horizontally), and (b) Measures concerning modernisation and diversification, financed
according to the region, by:
- Guarantee Section, the outside Objective 1 regions (ex Objective 5a and 5b-type)
- Guidance Section, the Objective 1 regions.© EIPA
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Generally, the support under the Structural Funds is programmed in Objective 1 and (new)
Objective 2 regions (that is, the disadvantaged areas with less than 75% of the EU average
per capita income, as well as the areas with structural difficulties (ex 5a+5b-type)
4. A first assessment of the new CAP reform - Major issues of concern in
the medium term
The Berlin Agreement on CAP, already integrated into the acquis
6, has been subject to
strong criticism by independent experts and bodies, while a numerous studies and reports
continue to indicate that the new reform cannot be considered as final. The watering down
of the initial proposals of the Commission concerning the most important agricultural
sectors (arable crops, beef and dairy products) do not seem sufficient to adjust supply to
market demand internally or to respond adequately to the external factors advocating
towards a new reform. It is argued that, most likely, the agreement is not going to face up to
either the likely demands of a new trade agreement under WTO or the problems expected to
appear from the forthcoming enlargement.
In the light of enlargement, in particular, there are various reasons indicating that the new
reform cannot be considered as final up to 2006. In the medium term, sometime around
2002-2003, when it is supposed that a first wave of new Members will enter the EU, major
issues of concern affecting the whole process of enlargement are expected to arise and call
for more definite solutions. In this respect, an effort is made below to identify some of these
issues, by taking especially into account that the two general approaches of the reform (price
cuts and increase of CPs) are closely related to the future enlargement.
4.1. The inadequacy of the price cuts
Although, from the very beginning, there was a broad agreement on price cuts, in the course
of the internal EU negotiations the M-S appeared to disagree strongly on the extent of
reductions proposed by the Commission.
At the end, the final compromise included:
•   A two-step price cut in arable sector by 15% (instead of one-step cut of 20%)
•   A three-step price cut in beef sector by 20% (instead of 30%)
•   A three-step price cut in dairy sector, beginning in 2005/06 (instead of 2000)
Although this general compromise is accompanied, of course, by various "modifications" in
the other parts of the proposals, the crucial question that arises is whether these price cuts
would be sufficient to meet the initial objectives of the reform, concerning the future
enlargement but also the expected developments in agricultural markets and the
repercussions for agriculture in total, inside the EU-15.
                                                          
6 Council Regulations No 1256-1259 of 17.5.1999 OJ L.160/26.6.1999© EIPA
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From the point of view of the new comers, it is clear that during the forthcoming accession
negotiations, one of the hard core topics in agriculture will be whether price levels between
EU and applicants differ substantially or not at the time of accession. As things have
developed, what will be the repercussions of the last price cuts for the negotiations?
1) Even with more moderate cuts, the price gaps (that still exist) between EU and the
applicants will tend to be eliminated at the time of accession, since the prices in all the
CEECs tend to increase rather rapidly at this stage. If eliminated, there will be no need for
transitional periods to align the prices as it was the case in all the previous accessions.
2) By lowering the level of EU prices, the farmers of the applicants should not expect to
benefit (even in the long run) from as high market support as it used to be in the past for the
present M-S. After accession, the farmers will enjoy perhaps a better market stability
through all the known mechanisms of CAP but they are not going to see any considerable
increase in their earnings (income) by enjoying price support. Since they will be excluded
from CPs (which have become the most effective way of farm income support in the EU-
15), the question is by which other means they will see an improvement in their income after
accession!
3) For products whose price will be still lower than the EU level at the time of accession,
even with a gradual increase of the prices of applicants to the recent EU levels, some sort of
special measures (specific transitional periods?) will have to be developed. The question is
whether this is allowed under the restricted financial framework agreed.
4) For products whose price will be higher than the recent EU levels (and there are such
cases that have been already reported), the negotiations will be even more complicated.
What kind of compensation the farmers will receive, if not CPs?
5) Furthermore and most important; the applicants are excluded from the compensation
payments, at least up to 2006. The increases of CPs that have now been agreed, will make
the negotiations even more difficult, since the competitive difference (between EU-15 and
CEEC) becomes higher and will increase demands for some counterbalancing mechanism.
From the point of view of the EU-15, a strong criticism is focused on the extent to which the
agreed price cuts will be sufficient to stabilise the markets in the next years to come, to
avoid surpluses and to improve considerably the competitiveness of EU products. According
to all the recent estimations and predictions, it seems that these objectives  will remain
unfulfilled for the foreseeable future.
Support prices, in general, will not be reduced enough and in time to eliminate export
subsidies, which was the major objective of the Agenda 2000 initiative. Only a higher world
price than the current level (and this is highly questionable under the latest world market
developments, especially in Asia and Russia) could prevent the EU having to pay export
subsidies. In that respect, limitations on exports and increases in stocks of the main
commodities would appear to be inevitable, at least up to 2003, while budgetary expenditure
on intervention buying and storage will tend to increase. Some examples:
•   Concerning  cereals, in particular, the Commission's proposal for a 20% cut of
intervention price in one-step intended to take a final step towards closing the existing
gap between EC price and the current level of world prices. In this case, intervention© EIPA
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would act only as a "safety-net" for farm incomes, while export subsidies, though
retained, would not be required under normal circumstances.  With the result of the final
compromise, this target clearly cannot be met, while the recent depression of world
agricultural markets and the WTO export commitments would both make stocks
unavoidable, regulated only by the operation of set-aside at the full 10% level for the
whole period.
•   In beef sector and despite the 20% price cut, there will be a major gap between the price
of beef in EU and the world market price. Even lower, this gap could only be filled by
export refunds. Therefore, the initial objective that the reformed regime would allow the
EU to export substantial volumes of beef in the near future without subsidies, does not
seem to be realistic.
•   In dairy sector, the postponement of the beginning of the reform will do nothing to
adjust supply to market demand.
By continuing the utilisation of export subsidies for all the major commodities, CAP is not
adapted sufficiently to the commitments of URAA and there is still a danger to be faced
with export cuts from 2000 onwards. In addition, by continuing the export subsidies as a
permanent instrument of CAP, the EU will be obliged to keep (once again) a defensive
stance in the next WTO Round, since it is rather sure that it will be faced with major attacks
on this issue by the other trade partners (USA, CAIRNS)
All those reasons  advocate that the package deal does not alter substantially the present
status of CAP, while it stands far from the original proposals of the Commission. It is rather
sure that EU will be forced to take additional decisions (towards further adjustments of the
reform) prior the expiration of 2006, sometime in the intermediate period, around 2002. In
any case, this prospect is indirectly implied and projected already in the text of the Berlin
agreement:
•   For cereals, “a decision upon a final reduction in the intervention price to be applied
from 2002/03 onwards will be taken in the light in the light of market developments”
upon a new proposal of the Commission. In addition, a higher or lower rate of set-aside
for any given year, can be re-decided on the basis of a Commission proposal
•   For oilseeds, the Commission is also called "to follow closely the developments of the
oilseed market" and this implies that the entire debate over the non-crop specific oilseed
aid will potentially re-opened in 2 years time
•   For beef sector, the Commission is called to “follow closely the market” and take
appropriate measures, if necessary (including possible intervention buying-in, that
would potentially alter the balances inside the agreed spending appropriations)
•   For daily sector, it is most likely that the whole package will be re-opened during the
review of the quota regime in 2003. Additionally, it should be noted that the decision to
extend the 3-year price framework up to 2008 goes beyond the present financial
framework (valid up until the end of 2006).
After all, the Agriculture Commissioner (Fischler, 29.6.1999) has already pointed out that
“the mid-term reviews might indicate that new problems are coming up on agricultural
markets and the CAP has to react”.© EIPA
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4.2. The future of CPs
Indeed, the whole matter of compensatory payments and their future is perhaps the major
issue of concern for both the present M-S and the applicant countries, for many reasons.
4.2.1 Financing the CPs
The final Berlin agreement on "stabilising" the agricultural budget gave perhaps a temporary
solution on the agricultural spending, but the whole debate is expected to re-appear,
especially when some budgetary difficulties bring first pressures again. For the time being,
"stabilization" of the overall spending does not affect the measure of CPs as an instrument of
compensating farmers' income for the price cuts. The original intention to increase them,
even at a lower rate at certain cases, remains. However, since the CPs already absorb more
than half of the total agricultural budget, it is rather sure that their overall size will be more
and more questionable in the near future, affecting their present financial status.
During the negotiations, three options appeared, all of them aiming to limit the financial
repercussions of CPs:
4.2.1.1.  The partial (75%) reimbursement
It was the first of these options, with the aim to reduce the overall amount of EC spending.
This option implied to make M-S responsible for paying through their national budgets 25%
of the compensatory payments to farmers. This option suggested that the agricultural
guideline should be reduced, while the impact of the reduction would be a redistribution of
national contributions to the Budget, by reducing i.e. Germany's contribution while
increasing that of France and DK, but also of Spain, Greece, Portugal, IRL (the cohesion
Cies).
This option, although clearly rejected, still have some supporters inside EU, especially
among those who are considered to be as "net contributors" in the Budget. Actually,
however, was not as "simple" as it looked: First, it would be clearly a movement towards re-
nationalising a significant part of CAP/Guarantee expenditure, away of financial solidarity
and of the objectives for social & economic cohesion, at the expense especially of those M-
S that are of most need for such payments. Although the Commission refused to use the
term "re-nationalisation", this did not change the essence of the proposal, because the direct
aids were introduced as compensations for cuts in prices previously supported entirely by
EAGGF. In this respect, this option could be considered rather selective, since no option
appeared, for instance, for partial re-imbursement of export subsidies, or set-aside
compensation, or storage expenditure. Second, a potential agreement on partial
reimbursement would not have an impact on the an overall size of CPs (an issue raised© EIPA
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especially by the competitors outside EC) but would lead only to a shift of the source of
financing from European to national budgets.
4.2.1.2. The option of "degressivity"
Under this option presented by the Commission, there could be a gradual reduction (3%
annually) in the CPs. Small producers would be excluded from the reduction (up to a receipt
of Euro 5 000) and a proportion of the many saved would be channeled into environmental
and structural activities.
Though not accepted, the importance of this proposal remains, because it establishes the
principle that the CPs should be reduced over time. Once established, the reduction
mechanism could be altered easily to achieve even a faster rate of reduction. And this plan
would potentially solve some particular policy problems:
•   It would initiate the means of eventually phasing out the CPs in the long run, and this
would constitute a generous "offer" of EU in the next WTO Round, allowing her to
stand more "agressively" in other issues,
•   It would achieve the desirable objective of stabilising or even lowering the agricultural
budget,
•   It would raise the "social" dimension of CAP, by maintaining income supplements to
small farmers while scaling down the level of payments currently paid (sometimes,
unnecessarily) to the large and efficient farmers,
•   It would be the basis for reconciling the conflict between the continued use of CPs in the
EU-15 and absorption of the agriculture of the applicants
The above advantages still remain. It would be expected, therefore, that the idea of
degressive CPs could come back on the table some time in the near future, as the more
feasible alternative in cases of relevant future difficulties.
4.2.1.3. "Ceilings on payments"
The last option was to place a ceiling on the total amount of aid payable per farm (capping).
In fact, this option was included into the original overall proposal of the Commission as part
of the "Horizontal Measures".  This option obviously met with a strong resistance especially
from UK and other members of the "London Club".
However, it should be considered as an open question. It is sure that, any re-appearance of
degressivity would be accompanied by renewed calls ( at least by 6 M-S) to impose ceilings
on payments. After all, the Court of Auditors (report, Dec. 1998) has pointed out that the
CPs are granted to farmers at the full rate with little consideration being taken of the size of
the holding. "40% of the CPs are distributed to 4% of the producers which are the biggest.
The CPs should be paid on the basis of profitability with the most competitive farmers
receiving less aid"
4.2.2. The CPs under the scrutiny of the Next WTO Round© EIPA
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Since the EU is now most legally committed to the CPs that have become a rather
permanent part of CAP, their acceptability in future Trade Agreements is becoming a very
disputed issue.
In this respect, we should take first into account the following parameters:
1) Since the payments were introduced in 1992-93, they are based on historical production
and not fluctuate with the level of output. In addition, they are fixed and not linked to
changes in the world market prices (unlike the oilseeds payments that, up to now, could be
adjusted up and down to reflect market price movements). Therefore, (the Commission still
argues) they should be considered largely as production-neutral.
2) For the major competitors of EU in world trade, it is obvious that the CPs are a
challenging measure. In the URA, direct payments that were not subject to reductions (that
is, with no incidence on production and trade, i.e. neutral) were classified as either "Blue" or
"Green Box" measures. According to US, however, the "Blue Box" has been invented as a
transitional measure. It reflected a compromise between the two parties to address certain
problems of the time (CPs and "deficiency payments") neither of which were completely
decoupled from production. Now the US has removed the deficiency payments from its
agricultural policy and, therefore, no longer needs the "Blue Box".
3) Other major competitors of the EU have already argued that compensatory payments of
cereals are a kind of "hidden export subsidies" and therefore contrary to the GATT
commitments.
It is, therefore, quite likely that the concept of CPs will become a major point in the new
agricultural trade negotiations to start under WTO.
What are the chances of defending this mechanism in the new Round?
We should take into account that, as indicated by the OECD, CPs have replaced market
support to a certain degree (50-60% of income of EU farmers) and are market distorting
measures. Besides, it is true that the CPs are paid in such a way that:
- do not create additional incentives to increase the crop area planted or numbers of animals
produced;
- do not increase yields by the use of additional variable inputs;
- do not act as a disincentive to consumption.
However, they still sustain production. And this is because the CPs to the individual
producers are still dependent upon the area planted or the number of animals kept. For
instance, even after the full  harmonisation of the CPs for cereals and oilseeds into one
arable area payment, this does not detach CPs from the area planted.
Other reports argue that even if the CPs are completely detached from production, their
continuation beyond a transitional period cannot be justified according to the WTO rules
and commitments, unless they are payments for some legitimate public good provisions (in
the form of rural development or cultural landscape).© EIPA
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The Commission has declared its intention to defend the CPs in the next Round as an
element of vital interest for the EU. From the EU part, at least, it has been repeatedly stated
that  the result of the Agenda negotiations represents the position of EU on the WTO.
However, according to the spirit of the Agenda, it is clearly intended that the CPs should
eventually be converted into some sort of social/environmental payment (i.e. through "cross-
compliance"). By making the CPs a generalised payment to arable producers, rather than
being specific to a particular crop, they automatically become more "production neutral" and
therefore more acceptable as qualifying for the "green box" category.
Apart of their high cost for the Community budget, it is generally expected that the
justification for the compensatory payments of the 1992 approach will be increasingly
challenged in the future.  (Although the "peace clause" between EU and US, included into
URAA, means that the CPs will not be open to scrutiny until 2003).
4.2.3. The CPs and the Applicant countries
In respect to the candidate countries, it is clear and it has been repeatedly stated that the
agenda does not include them among the recipients.
It is true that there are arguments in favour of this exclusion. Firstly, the direct aids were
introduced in 1992 as compensations for certain price cuts. In this respect and given that the
prices in the 10 applicants are not going to be reduced but most likely increased following
adhesion, their farmers would not be eligible for reform compensation since they would not
have suffered any price cuts. Otherwise, adding the direct payments to expected price
increases, would represent an inordinate cash injection for those farmers. Such a
development would create rather income disparities that could rapidly lead to social tension
in the countries and regions concern.
However, it is equally under question whether it would be possible, both economically and
legally, to exclude some farmers of an enlarged EU from such payments. In other words,
this exclusion would be tantamount to discrimination. In fact, the EU would appear to grant
richer farmers of the EU-15 direct payments that could help them to out-compete the
farmers of the candidates on the domestic enlarged market.
The further increase of CPs through the Agenda, increases the competitive difference
between EU-15 and the applicants, which has to be overcome by some counterbalancing
mechanism. In this respect, and given that in certain applicant countries some agricultural
prices are already at the same or even higher level than in EU, it is rather sure that the issue
of the CPs to farmers will become one of the hotly contested  topics in the accession
negotiations.
4.3. The innovations of the Agenda
4.3.1. National Envelopes© EIPA
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The introduction of "National Envelops" is, without doubt, one of the most important
innovations in the final CAP agreement package. It is supposed that, by distributing half of
the increase of the CPs in livestock products  directly to the M-S (which are entitled to
allocate them to their farmers according to their own priorities), “National Envelops” are a
response to the calls for greater subsidiarity.
However, although finally accepted, the whole concept was met with great skepticism if not
with suspicion by some of the present M-S. In particular, fears were expressed that, either
"National Envelops" would be potentially the "Trojan Horse" in the future towards a re-
nationalisation of CAP from the "back door", or they would distort competition within the
EU’s single market, since they would be implemented according to national criteria (M-S
could place different emphasis on different areas of production).
According to the Commission, the national envelopes would give M-S more flexibility over
deciding how to allocate some aid payments to help specific groups of farmers [by
favouring either the grass-fed extensive producers or the large scale herds intensively fed].
However, this flexibility may have adverse effects on the environment and it would appear
to be a contradiction to the overall target, to promote the extensification methods of
production.
Since the National Envelopes were retained at the final deal, it should be expected that,
most probably, they will become another permanent element of CAP. Even if the total
amount of this additional funding is, for the time being, 74% lower than that foreseen in the
original proposal, it would be very difficult, for instance, to abolish the measure in the
future. Therefore, even if the applicant countries are excluded from the CPs at least up to
2006, the debate is rather bound to be rekindled in the future. Given also the disagreements
that have been expressed on this issue among the present M-S, any compromise in the
medium or longer-run may affect the whole process of enlargement as well.
4.3.2. Cross-compliance and Modulation
The “cross-compliance” principle offers to the M-S the possibility of linking the CPs to
environmental objectives. This is undoubtedly a positive measure in terms of taking
additional steps towards a further protection of the environment but also in terms of a move
towards  defending the CPs in the next WTO Round.
Additionally, it is supposed that this provision gives the M-S the legal basis for awarding the
direct support schemes (including the CPs) only to those farmers that are genuinely engaged
in farming (R.1259/1999, Article 7). In other words, “cross-compliance” can be used as a
means of ending the abuses made in the past by certain individuals who were able to apply
for direct payments although they were not real farmers (by making clever use of legal
loopholes).
However, a number of future concerns may arise here, due to the fact that the environmental
measures that have to be applied by the farmers and the sanctions against those who do not© EIPA
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respect the environmental requirements, do not follow common rules but are to be defined
by the individual M-S and to be applied subject to the M-S own choice.
Similarly, modulation is also an innovation that may operate as an incentive for creating
greater employment opportunities, since it is expected that farms (if they wish to be fully
eligible of the CPs) would be “obliged” to compare their annual labour against a national
average.
However, since the scheme (if  introduced by a M-S) will be applied on the basis of
nationally defined rules, there are concerns over how a “labour force unit” would be
objectively defined. There is also certain scepticism whether the measure could discriminate
against more efficient farmers.
Generally, the concerns that may arise in the near future are attributed to the following:
1. The question remains how the Commission will safeguard the equal treatment of farmers
along all the present M-S (and not only within each M-S), since both schemes will be
regulated and implemented by the national authorities and according to their own priorities.
The whole issue should be expected to become even more complicated, after the accession
of the first new comers into the EU. Since the new comers are excluded from CPs, it is
obvious that they will neither be obliged nor have any incentive to apply the above schemes
in most sectors.  Once again the farmers in both sides will be treated discriminatorily.
2. Other questions have been arised on how the (nationally defined) measures on cross-
compliance might be implemented and which conditions would be considered suitable.
Although the Commission argues that the M-S can define their own standards under the
principle of "subsidiarity", the M-S are afraid that, among other things, certain
complications may arise due to the fact that, up to now, the implementation and the
administration of all the basic mechanisms of CAP are relied on common rules.
3. Some M-S find the cross-compliance scheme closer but not sufficient to meet the criteria
for switching the CPs from "blue box" into "green box", by simply offering to M-S the
possibility of linking payments to environmental criteria. The URAA states that green-box
payments for environmental reasons must be fully decoupled from production and part of a
“clearly-defined environmental or conservation programme” dependent upon the fulfillment
of specific conditions. But, for the time being, the arable area payments are not fully
decoupled since they still depend on the average yield of each region.
In this respect, it is true that the "cross-compliance" scheme has the potential to be extended
further in the future. In fact, this provision puts in place a mechanism for future full linking
of farm payments to environmental objectives. Although the M-S did not like the idea of
such a potential, especially before the issue of CPs is defended as it stands in the next
Round, the agreed text already makes the provision that the farmers should not consider the
support conditions remaining unchanged but “should be prepared for a possible review of
schemes in the light of the market developments”.© EIPA
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4. Perhaps the most important concern is due to the fact that both innovative measures of
cross-compliance and modulation imply an expensive and complicated mechanism to be
built-up  financed by the national budget of the M-S. Among other things, an effective
implementation of the scheme requires an additional administrative capacity. And if this
can be solved relatively easily in the more advanced M-S, certainly would not be the case if
the weaker M-S or the new comers are to be taken into consideration.
5. Conclusions – A radical reform or a minor adjustment?
It is rather sure that the reform agreed cannot be considered as radical. No one of the initial
objectives set by the Commission seems to be served. The EU leaders preferred modest
changes by ensuring that EAGGF spending remains within the budgetary limits rather, than
adopting a radical reform. In that respect, the problems that have been already identified are
not resolved. That is why many spectators believe that a further reform of CAP will be
necessary before 2006.
After all, a number of  "clauses" pass the responsibility back to the Commission for
reviewing the policy in the near future, and therefore, leaving open the prospect of further
periodic revisions in the interim period between 2000 and 2006.
In relation to the deal made by the Farm Ministers on March 11, 1999, the final Berlin
agreement appears to be even less ambitious:
•   It delays the dairy reform until 2005/06
•   It reduces the cut in support price of cereals from 20% to 15%
•   It introduces again a costly set-aside rate of 10% for all the 7 years
•   It re-adjusts the beef reform to allow for the possibility of ad-hoc intervention buying
•   With the overall aim to "stabilise" the budget, the delays were preferred to other more
effective options like reducing the CPs over time by using the models of "capping" or
"degressivity".
•   Agricultural trade and intervention schemes will continue to depend on the markets,
both internally and externally
In relation to the initial objectives of the reform, the Berlin agreement can not be considered
that contributes a lot to the achievement of most of them:
•   The competitiveness of EC agricultural products does not improve considerably (at least
the first 2-3 years of the implementation), since support prices will not be reduced
enough to allow an expansion of exports without subsidies
•   The risk of future surpluses remains, while the reform is inadequate to achieve an
adaptation of the CAP to the imperatives of URAA
•   Most probably, the decisions will push EU towards a "defensive" and not "aggressive"
stance in the next WTO Round:
- The level of price adjustment will not remove the need for export subsidies© EIPA
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- The partial reduce of domestic prices will mean that EU tariffs cannot be reduced
at a level sufficient to give any new concessions on tariff reduction (which other
WTO parties will be seeking)
- There is no any indication about the future size of CPs
•   Environmental aspects are not always fully taken into account. For instance, intensive
livestock production is rather encouraged than discouraged through the “national
envelopes”, even if it coincides with tighter environmental limitations in other sectors.
The prospect of agricultural polarisation remains as combination of intensive farming
(with impact on soils, water, and biodiversity) and land marginalisation. Generally, even
if Agenda 2000 decisions have included additional measures to address environmental
issues, these measures are considered inadequate, unless they become obligatory, fully
implemented, and on the assumption that increased funding is provided either by
national or by EU financing
7.
•   The prospect of enlargement is rather undervalued. This would suggest either that EU
does not expect the adhession of the 5+1 applicants to occur within the period of 2002-
2006 or that it is admitted that further special measures will have to be developed to deal
with the open issues.
•   The simplification of EU legislation is rather attained, but at the expense of the national
administration. Many thousands of administrators (inspectors and other officials) will
need to be recruited simply to operate the basic machinery of CAP. Beyond this point,
however, of which the applicants are already aware, the recent agreement makes the
accommodation of the new comers (administratively) even more difficult than initially
predicted. Examples:
-  All the elements of the Agenda, could bring a real administrative headache, not
only to the present M-S but, most important, to the applicants. For instance, the various rules
concerning cross-compliance, modulation, etc mean that these payments may be adjustable
at the level of the individual farm, dependent on the size of farms, the workforce used, the
environmental practices and so on. This implies a full system of information about the
relevant elements.
- To activate the set-aside regime (since it is continued beyond 2000), a new
Member needs to have a land registry in place (Hungary does not have).
- The implementation of milk quotas is going to be the most striking effect. Since the
milk quota arrangements are to continue, rules have to be established in the new comers, to
establish national overall guaranteed quantities to individual producers.  In this case, for
instance, how Poland is going to implement the regime with 3,5 million dairy herds and an
average size of 3-5 cow/farm? Italy, with 2 million cows has still problems with the
management of quotas, after 14 years of efforts. In Greece, with less that 200 000 cows, it
took over 3 years to establish a well- managed system.
- The potential introduction of "National Envelops" for beef and dairy products in
the new comers, even in the long run, will significantly increase the administrative burden
on National Ministries.
                                                          
7 “Views of Environmental Organisations on the Helsinki Process.” Paper submitted by eight NGOs to the
informal meeting of EU Council for Environment, Finland, 24-25/7/1999© EIPA
23
As a result of all the above remarks, one could rather safely conclude that the final
agreement on the CAP component of the Agenda can be categorised as a minor adjustment
of the 1992 reform (which was surely radical!), rather than a real reform.
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